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Abstract 
Nationalism and national self-assertion have been core values of the Chinese 
Communist Party throughout its history and also represent a key narrative of 
Chinese history in the 20th century, although the social bases from which the 
nationalism derives and the manner in which this nationalism is expressed 
have changed over time. From the 1990s onwards, the party-state's preferred 
discourse on nationalism has been couched in terms of patriotism, while a 
popular nationalism has emerged, which at times goes beyond and challenges 
that of the party-state. The implications of this are addressed in the present pa- 
per with regard to the PRC's relations with Taiwan and Japan and with regard 
to the debate on ideology and Asian Values. It is argued that rising popular 
nationalism increasingly challenges state autonomy in the first two areas, but 
tends to be supportive of the state with regard to the third. 
Introduction 
National self-assertion has been a core value of Chinese political elites 
since before the formation of the People's Republic in 1949. However, 
only since the 1990s has the Chinese state been able to exert sustained 
influence over regional and global politics. The 1990s witnessed an in- 
crease in the economic, political and military capabilities of the Chinese 
state, together with the emergence of a discourse of popular national- 
ism in China which at times goes beyond the aims and objectives of 
the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Nationalism is understood here 
to be a series of domestic political and social forces and sentiments, 
whereas national self-assertion is the translation of those forces into state 
policy and state action. While the CCP has always sought to mobilize 
nationalism to secure its legitimacy, the new 'popular' nationalism is 
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increasingly a constraint on, and a potential threat to, its leadership. In 
the context of self-assertion, this leads to a reduction of state autonomy 
in a range of areas, including policy toward Taiwan, the United States 
and Japan. One area where self-assertion is less problematic for the 
CCP is the Chinese challenge to the liberal ideology of key international 
financial institutions and the universal aspirations of the human rights 
regime. What has emerged in recent years is a tension between the state 
nationalist project and the aspirations of popular nationalism, and the 
key issue for the future is whether the 'Fourth Generation' of leaders 
under President Hu Jintao will act as a moderating influence on growing 
popular demands for China to assert itself, or find themselves forced to 
be its representatives-the 'fourth' representation. 
This paper locates the tradition of Chinese self-assertion through a 
consideration of the nationalist discourses that have emerged in China in 
the 20th century. It is argued that a consideration of contending national- 
isms offers one possible explanatory narrative for political change and 
action in China. It is suggested that nationalism in China has emerged as 
a response to imperialism and modernity and can be useful categorized 
into two discrete forms. On the one side is a conservative nationalism, 
rooted in the cities and amongst the Chinese bourgeoisie, which sought 
inspiration from western liberal and democratic thinking. On the other 
is a radical nationalism, rooted in the countryside and amongst the 
peasantry and working classes and seeking inspiration from the western 
tradition. These two nationalist responses to modernity coalesced in the 
Chinese Civil War, which saw the communists victorious on the Chinese 
mainland (Deans 2005). Subsequently, Chinese nationalism in the PRC 
remains dominated by state objectives because of the pervasive control 
of society that resulted from the authoritarian Leninist structure of the 
PRC. However, the economic and political reforms in China since 1978 
have seen the CCP transform itself into a conservative nationalist party. 
So while radical nationalism has withered, the CCP now confronts a 
popular nationalism from Chinese society which increasingly acts as a 
constraint on its ability to pursue rational and coherent strategies. 
This paper addresses three areas where the changing dynamics 
within Chinese nationalism are having an impact on Chinese self- 
assertion: the relationship with Taiwan, relations with Japan, and the 
PRC's relationship with international regimes and organizations. With 
regard to Taiwan, it is argued that the 'wait and see' policy pursued 
by the Chinese leadership since the late 1990s may be challenged by 
growing popular demands for the Taiwan issue to be resolved, and 
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the Chinese leadership's ability to compromise with the Taiwanese 
authorities is constrained by popular sentiment. A similar argument is 
developed with regard to Sino-Japanese relations, where strong anti- 
Japanese sentiment in China already places limits on the CCP's ability 
to improve relations with Japan for the sake of the economic reform 
programme. Popular demands for greater national self-assertion against 
Japan threaten the ability of the CCP to pursue a rational and mature 
relationship. Finally, self-assertion is less problematic with regard to the 
PRC's participation in international regimes, although this may lead to 
a degree of conflict with other countries, particular the United States of 
America and member countries of the European Union. The Chinese 
government's emphasis on the principle of sovereignty and its criticism 
of the western approach to human rights and the economic ideologies of 
some international financial institutions garner domestic support from 
important sectors within China, in addition to support from developing 
countries in Asia and Africa. 
The ongoing dynamics of Chinese nationalism do not lend themselves 
to straightforward categorization. Data are contested and interpretations 
have become highly politicized. This is due to a number of factors, such 
as the pressures of the Cold War on western scholarship or because of 
ongoing debates regarding China's changing political and economic 
significance since the end of the Cold War, and the implications of this 
for Europe, North America and China's Asian neighbours. The analysis 
here tries to recentre China within discourses on Chinese history and 
nationalism, as suggested by Paul Cohen (Cohen 1984). This discourse 
will be straightforward (although not necessarily uncontroversial) to 
most readers familiar with the contemporary scholarship on Chinese 
history (Pepper 2004), although such discussion rarely features in the 
literature on China during the Cold War (Saull2001; Westad 2000). This 
paper suggests one possible heuristic narrative which identifies a spec- 
trum of nationalist responses. Moreover it suggests that political agency 
focuses these into two dominant strands: a conservative and a radical 
nationalism, which comprise the two key forms of Chinese response 
to modernity in the 20th century. In turn this narrative helps elucidate 
issues bound up with contemporary Chinese nationalism. 
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Nationalism and Legitimacy in the Reform Period: 
State Patriotism versus Popular Nationalism 
Since the foundation of the PRC, the CCP has derived a key source of 
its legitimacy from its nationalist credentials and its pursuit of a nation- 
alist project. Of course, the CCP's legitimacy derived from more than 
just this source - its programmes of social and economic reform were 
also vital - but these programmes were inseparable from the national- 
ist agenda (Pepper 2004). From the early 1950s until the 1980s the CCP 
routinely mobilized nationalism as a vehicle to maintain its power and 
achieve its objectives. The PRC in this period (with the possible excep- 
tion of the chaotic first two years of the Cultural Revolution, 1966-68) 
was a strongly authoritarian Leninist regime in which the party-state 
aspired to exercise almost total control over society. However, by the 
late 1970s and following the death of Mao, the CCP faced increasing 
problems with its legitimacy. The mistakes within the Great Leap 
Forward and the Cultural Revolution, the death of the charismatic 
revolutionary leader, and the visible reconfigurations of the PRC's 
international relations all combined to undermine the authority of the 
CCP. Deng Xiaoping's response was to begin a series of political and 
economic reforms to reinvigorate the economic credentials of the CCP. 
While economic legitimacy was the key strategy for Deng, appeals to 
patriotism remained important throughout the 1980s, and Pye, Zheng 
and others have argued that nationalism increasingly replaces Marx- 
ism-Leninism as the underlying ideology of CCP rule (Pye 1996; Zheng 
1999). Nonetheless, as the Leninist authoritarianism of the Mao period 
declined, the CCP faced increasing challenges from Chinese society, 
especially during periods of economic difficulty. 
The CCP leadership continued to appeal to Chinese nationalism 
(minzuzhuyi) to legitimize its role, using state media and the education 
system to promote a particular vision of China and its future. However, 
disagreements within the leadership over emphasis and tensions over 
nationalist aspirations within the Chinese periphery (most notably in 
Taiwan and Tibet) saw a shift towards a more inclusive patriotism 
(aiguozhuyi). Patriotism in this context is inspired by a 'love of country' 
that is accessible to all citizens of the state, whereas nationalism is typi- 
cally a more narrow ideology centred on a specific ethnic group. In this 
way, 'patriotism' should be seen as the officially sanctioned discourse 
of nationalism in China (Zheng 1999: 88). Immediately after the tur- 
moil of the student-led reform movement in 1989, the CCP under the 
direction of Jiang Zemin and Li Ruihuan initiated a series of patriotic 
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campaigns which focused on China's past humiliations and on the role 
of the CCP in defending China (Zhongyao wenxian zhaibian 1990). As Xu 
demonstrates, anniversaries of 'public humiliations' such as the Opium 
Wars were commemorated with a very high profile by the senior leader- 
ship (Xu 2001), and this culminated in 1994 with the publication of the 
'Outline for the Implementation of Patriotic Education' (Renmin Ribao, 
6 September 1994). 
Significantly, nationalism and patriotism became the rallying cry of 
those who challenged the CCP on a range of issues. In the 1980s many 
Chinese intellectuals paid great attention to western countries as po- 
tential models for China, and there was widespread criticism of many 
aspects of China's past as being a hindrance to China's development. 
However, the 1990s saw the emergence of a growing rejection of the 
west and western models and focus on 'Chinese' solutions to China's 
problems (Xu 2001). The student-led reform movement of 1989 is per- 
haps the turning point in the emergence of a new, popular nationalist 
discourse in the PRC to exist outside the control of the Communist Party. 
The excellent analysis of China's new nationalism by Peter Hays Gries 
shows how growing nationalist sentiment in Chinese society during the 
1990s increasingly became a problem for the Chinese leadership (Gries 
2004). The mid-1990s saw a growing expression of popular nationalism 
through the publication of books such as Song et al.'s Zhongguo keyi shuo 
' bu ' [The China that Can Say 'No'] (Song et al. 1996) and the widespread 
use of the internet as a vehicle for discussion by Chinese nationalists 
(Deans 2004b). While the CCP has continued to mount patriotic cam- 
paigns and engage in the promotion of nationalism as a mechanism for 
promoting legitimacy, a popular nationalist discourse has increasingly 
offered a challenge to the CCP, as was seen in popular reaction to the 
dispute with Japan over control of the Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands, the 
bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade, and the death of a Chinese 
pilot following a collision with an American spy plane (Gries 2004). 
What is interesting about the PRC is that the end of the Cold War, an 
event that dominates the politics and international relations of Europe 
and North America, is relatively unimportant with regard to China's 
relations with other Asian countries. It is significant mainly in the context 
of the PRC-USA relationship, but the fundamental shift in the PRC's 
relations with other Asian countries takes place in the 1970s. There has 
been a tendency in the literature to overstate the significance of the end 
of the Cold War for the PRC. In the 1990s it has been the internal dvnam- 
ics of the reform process and the unresolved tensions within Chinese 
nationalism, rather than change in the international system, that has 
had most significance for Chinese self-assertion. 
Complementarity between the economic goals of the reform pro- 
gramme and national self-assertion is not guaranteed. The greatest ten- 
sions exist when more narrowly defined nationalist objectives conflict 
with the wider economic priorities of the reform programme. This is 
visible in a number of policy areas, including the PRC's approach to 
cross-Strait relations and bilateral relations between the PRC and the 
United States and Japan. Conflicts exist in the Chinese leadership over 
the relative emphasis that should be placed on national self-assertion and 
economic growth, and these tensions, combined with growing popular 
nationalist aspirations, may significantly hinder the autonomy of the 
Chinese state to pursue rational and coherent strategies in this regard. 
The Chinese state remains very powerful, but it is no longer able to 
exercise the all-pervasive power of Chinese society that it enjoyed be- 
fore the start of the reform programme in 1978. The reform programme 
has seen a gradual and ongoing reduction in both state autonomy (the 
ability of the central government to make planning decisions without 
excessive or undue influence over these decisions) and state capacity 
(the ability to physically implement a decision once it is taken, i.e. to 
enforce the law, make local authorities follow central directives and to 
extract, regulate, legitimate and coerce) (Deans 2004a). As was shown 
in 1989, when faced with serious levels of unrest, the CCP is able and 
willing to use lethal force to ensure its continuing rule, but the costs of 
this are well understood by the leadership. The costs must be counted 
not just in human terms, but in potential damage to the Party's cred- 
ibility, economic costs in terms of the impact of falling investment and 
possible sanctions, and the damage done to the PRC's international 
reputation and prestige and pursuit of a peaceful and stable interna- 
tional environment. 
Maintaining high levels of surveillance and control over society, 
especially in the context of new forms of media such as the internet, is 
expensive and possibly unsustainable (Deans 2004b). The senior Chi- 
nese leadership fears that public pressure over an ostensible 'patriotic' 
concern-such as the desire for national reunification with Taiwan or 
holding Japan to account for its past abuses of China-may result in 
direct attacks on say, American or Japanese interests in the PRC. Even 
more troubling, the criticism could be directed at the CCP's handling of 
these events, and snowball into mass anti-government demonstrations 
that mobilize nationalism as a mechanism to attack the CCP. Controlling 
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and policing this kind of unrest is possible in the short term, but the 
medium- to long-term costs could be highly damaging, especially if, as 
in 1989, the protestors seek legitimacy though appeals to nationalism. It 
is in this area that state patriotism could clash with popular nationalism, 
and where societal demands for greater self-assertion by the Chinese 
state could lead to conflict, both within the PRC and between the PRC 
and other members of international society. 
Self-Assertion and the Unresolved Civil War: 
Cross-Strait Relations 
There is little doubt that tensions exist between, on the one hand, the 
CCP's use of nationalism and patriotism and the objectives of the eco- 
nomic reform programme and, on the other, the calls for a peaceful and 
stable international environment to foster China's development. These 
tensions are manifest in a number of policy areas, particularly in the 
cross-Strait relationship with Taiwan, where the unresolved Chinese 
civil war continues to challenge the CCP's legitimacy, albeit in new ways. 
The recovery of Taiwan is of fundamental importance to the nationalist 
project of the CCP. Indeed, reunification with Taiwan represents the 
key remaining component of the ambition of national reunification and 
bringing down the curtain on the 'century of shame and humiliation' 
that the Chinese people suffered at the hands of western and Japanese 
imperialism (Deans 2005). PRC policy toward Taiwan has undergone 
significant shifts since 1949, and the key strategy at present appears to 
be one of attempting to lock the Taiwanese economy into the Chinese 
developmental trajectory while maintaining a hard line on Taiwan's in- 
ternational status. Taiwan has become a major investor into the PRC, and 
a vibrant and dynamic economic relationship has developed over the last 
15 years. However, the emergence of a separatist Taiwanese nationalism 
challenges the overarching CCP objectives, and the Chinese leadership's 
response to the changes on Taiwan could threaten the key aspects of the 
reform process by generating a regional military conflict. 
Cross-Strait relations from the early 1990s to the present demonstrate 
an intrinsic contradiction. By most quantitative measures, Taiwan and 
the Chinese mainland have never been closer. Trade, investment and ex- 
change of peoples across the Strait have boomed since official restrictions 
on indirect trade and travel were lifted. There is more exchange across 
the Taiwan Strait today than at any time in the past-whether compared 
to when Taiwan was on the periphery of the Qing empire or when the 
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island was a colony of Japan. Added to this, the economic differences 
between Taiwan and the wealthier parts of the PRC such as Shanghai 
and Guangdong are far less apparent than they were when cross-Strait 
exchanges resumed in 1988. However, by most qualitative measures the 
two sides have never been further apart. Although the economic system 
in the PRC increasingly resembles the strong-state capitalist system of 
Taiwan, the political systems register a strong divide, with an increas- 
ingly democratic Taiwan offering a contrast to the soft authoritarianism 
of the PRC. Most importantly in the context of Chinese nationalism, the 
political differences between the Chinese leadership in Beijing and the 
current Democratic Progressive Party regime of Chen Shui-bian have 
never been greater. In particular, a growing number of people on Taiwan 
no longer identify themselves with China (or, at least, the PRC's vision 
of China) and there is a growing sympathy for the idea of establishing 
an independent Taiwanese state. The conservative nationalism of the 
Chiang Kai-shek and Chiang Ching-kuo eras has given way in the 1990s 
to an assertive Taiwanese nationalism which has seen identity politics 
hijack the emerging democratic institutions and electoral discourse (Shih 
2003a). Political competition in Taiwan has been increasingly defined 
around the dynamics of Taiwanese identity and the future status of the 
island vis-2-vis its relationship with the People's Republic. 
For the CCP the national mission of reunification is central to its le- 
gitimacy, and Taiwan is the most important element in this programme. 
While the Taiwan issue was peripheral to CCP concerns before it came 
to power, since 1949 it has repeatedly made public claims that Taiwan 
and the Chinese mainland will be reunified. The official position is clear 
and direct: 
The Chinese government and people absolutely have the determination and 
ability to safeguard China's sovereignity and territorial integrity, and will 
never tolerate, condone or remain indifferent to the reslization of any scheme 
to divide China. (The Taiwan Question and Reunification of China 1993) 
Any survey of Chinese government statements and announcements on 
the Taiwan question makes it clear that the issue is of the highest importance 
to the Chinese leadership and that all methods, including the use of military 
force, will be used to prevent Taiwanese independence or to ensure eventual 
reunification. In 1995 and 1996 the Chinese leadership found it necessary to 
engage in a series of military exercises to demonstrate to both the Taiwan and 
the United States the seriousness with which the CCP regarded the question 
of reunification (Zhao 1999). However, despite its occasional martial public 
rhetoric, since the 1996 crisis the Chinese leadership has followed a passive 
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policy of 'wait and see' toward Taiwan (Zhao 2003) and has avoided pro- 
voking pro-independence sentiment on Taiwan. The 'wait and see' policy 
and attempts at accommodation by the CCP have continued in the face of 
concerted efforts by former President Lee Teng-hui and then by President 
Chen Shui-bian to delay, stall or derail attempts at restarting the dialogue 
across the Strait that began in the early 1990s (Deans 2005). However the 
extension of the discourse on patriotism to Hong Kong, and the use of the 
term 'unpatriotic' being applied to critics of Beijing, have generated concerns 
in both Hong Kong and Taiwan over the use of this agenda to define the 
politically acceptable and unacceptable (Kyodo, 13 February 2004). 
While the senior leadership of the CCP has pursued a cautious strategy 
toward Taiwan, it has found itself confronted with growing dissatisfac- 
tion at the speed and pace of the quest for reunification. For popular 
nationalists in the PRC the Taiwan issue brings together all the key ele- 
ments of the 'century of shame1-China's weakness in the 19th century, 
Japanese imperialism, and US interventionism in the Cold War. Added 
to this are the psychological issues of rejection that are generated by the 
refusal of many Taiwanese to 'return to the motherland'. The CCP still 
retains considerable mechanisms for asserting and maintaining control 
over popular dissent in the PRC, but the levers of control are not as per- 
vasive as they were under Mao. The CCP's uncertainty that it would be 
able to control popular anger over the Taiwan question means that its 
ability to pursue a strategy of 'wait and see' and to offer compromises to 
the Taiwanese over the time and terms of reunification are constrained. 
Clearly, Taiwanese investment in the Chinese economic development 
agenda is important, and the goal of a peaceful international environ- 
ment within which to promote economic growth remains central to the 
CCP's current objectives. However, the dangers to the CCP's authority of 
moves toward independence by Taiwan are such that the Chinese lead- 
ership may find that it can only retain authority if it responds militarily 
to unilateral attempts by the Taiwanese to change the status quo in the 
Strait. Moreover, opinion in the PRC toward the Taiwan question ap- 
pears to be hardening (Straits Times, 15 June 2004). The Anti-Succession 
Law that was passed by the National People's Congress in March 2005 
should be viewed in this context-although it must be remembered that 
this law did not change PRC policy toward Taiwan, it merely provided 
a legal framework which recognized a long-standing policy position. 
This leaves the Chinese leadership in the precarious position of hoping 
that the US can constrain an increasingly erratic Taiwanese leadership 
from provoking conflict (Shih 2003b). 
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The Limits of Pragmatism: Self-Assertion, Popular 
Nationalism and Sino-Japanese Relations 
It is a common assumption in liberal readings of international relations 
that growing interaction and contact, and in particular increased com- 
mercial and business exchange, increase mutual understanding and 
deepen interdependence between countries. This is turn is expected to 
lead to improved relations (Yahuda n.d.). However, this has not been 
an obvious result of growing Sino-Japanese interaction, and it appears 
that the opposite may be the case with anti-Japanese sentiment being 
increasingly apparent in the PRC and anti-Chinese sentiment also on 
the rise in Japan. For example, it is reported that the growing number of 
Chinese students studying in Japan are leaving the country with their 
prejudices reinforced (Taipei Times, 29 March 2004). Self-assertion and 
popular nationalism have generated clear problems with regard to the 
PRC's relations with Japan. The relationship with Japan has been the 
PRC's most difficult partnership as the relationship exists in the shadow 
of a tragic history of Japanese aggression in China before 1945, and this 
history has been contested and exploited for political purposes by the 
government and nationalist groups on both sides. Fifty years of Japa- 
nese aggression and imperialism have become central to the ongoing 
discourse of Chinese identity and Chinese nationalism, and popular anti- 
Japanese sentiment in the PRC appears to be growing (Shih 2000). 
Japan and the People's Republic of China established diplomatic rela- 
tions in 1972, and the first 15 years of relations were marked by growing 
economic interaction and a degree of common political cause, with some 
commentators regarding the period 1972-89 as the 'golden age' of Sino- 
Japanese relations (Vogel et al. 2002). Nonetheless, this period was not 
without problems as the historical legacy of poor relations continued 
to factor in the relationship. Disputes over the portrayals of history in 
Japanese school textbooks (Rose 1998), the visit of Japanese leaders to the 
Yasukuni Shrine (Yang 2002), the nature of any official Japanese apolo- 
gy for its aggression against China (Gries 2004), the territorial dispute 
over control of the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands (Deans 2000), and Japan's 
informal relations with Taiwan (Deans 2002) ensured a background of 
disaffection throughout this period. One important issue was the way 
in which intra-elite conflict in the Chinese leadership often used the 
issue of Japan as a cloak for opposition to the reform programme-the 
dismissal of Hu Yaobang in 1987 was surrounded by an atmosphere 
that Hu was too sympathetic to the Japanese. 
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The Japanese government took a pragmatic approach to the events 
of 1989 in China and the suppression of the student-led reform move- 
ment in Tiananmen Square, and was the first G7 country to lift sanctions 
against Beijing. In the 1990s Japan, along with the Untied States, was 
the most important foreign player in China's rapid economic growth 
and was the most important single provider of overseas development 
assistance. However the political climate, at the popular if not the gov- 
ernment level, continued to deteriorate. Writing some five years ago, 
Rose suggested that because the nationalism apparent in both China and 
Japan was 'inward-oriented', it was unlikely to have a seriously negative 
impact on the bilateral relationship (Rose 2000). However, subsequent 
events have shown that the popular antagonism in the relationship has 
constrained the ability of the government to allow the relationship to 
develop in a more mature manner, and one influential Japanese inter- 
pretation places responsibility firmly with Jiang Zemin and the Patriotic 
Education Campaigns of the 1990s (Torii 2004). 
While the Chinese state's attempts at promoting nationalism and 
patriotism to secure its legitimacy have been significant, popular na- 
tional self-assertion over relations with Japan has far exceeded what the 
leadership regards as acceptable and has become a serious problem in 
maintaining a stable relationship with Japan. Nationalism has always 
been the key motor of the territorial dispute over the Diaoyu/Senkaku 
Islands (Deans 2000). While remaining resolute in their stated position 
of claming sovereignty over the islands, both the Chinese and Japanese 
have been at pains to downplay the dispute in the context of the wider 
political and economic interests at stake in the bilateral relationship. 
Nevertheless, the islands are the subject of frequent clashes between 
nationalists on both sides and the ongoing dispute over the Diaoyu/ 
Senkaku Islands has continued to threaten the relationship. The visit 
of Japan's Foreign Minister Kawaguchi Yoriko to Beijing in April 2004 
was overshadowed by a group of Chinese nationalists landing on the 
islands. The Japanese government responded by arresting the Chinese 
and then sending them back to China (Kyodo, 4 April 2004) which in 
turn angered Japanese nationalists who believed the Chinese should 
have been subjected to legal process. 
In 2003 angry Chinese responses to a series of incidents, ranging from 
the discovery of Japanese chemical weapons stockpiles left over from 
the war against China to the activities of Japanese sex tourists in the 
PRC, demonstrated the depth of popular hostility toward Japan. Chinese 
activists used the internet to organize petitions demanding apologies 
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from Japan and compensation for those who had suffered as a result 
of Japan's action before 1945, and it was reported that over one million 
signatures were obtained (BBC Online, 18 September 2003). The serious 
nature of the popular swell of anti-Japanese opinion was demonstrated 
clearly during the Asian Cup football tournament where the Japanese 
team was subjected to abuse by Chinese supporters, with Japanese flags 
being burnt and players threatened (BBC Online, 7 August 2004). 
The problem posed by rising anti-Japanese sentiment in China is 
recognized by the Chinese government, and the visit to Beijing in April 
2004 by the Japanese Foreign Minister Kawaguchi Yoriko is reported 
to have expressed her concern about the possible negative impact of 
'patriotic' material on Chinese web sites. The Chinese are understood to 
have responded that the Japanese government must do more to prevent 
incidents that damage the bilateral relationship (Kyodo, 4 April 2004). 
Where attempts have been made by Chinese intellectuals to improve the 
climate of the debate over relations with Japan, there has often been a 
furious backlash from popular nationalists in the PRC. Perhaps the most 
important case was that of Ma Licheng, a high-profile writer and critic 
associated with liberal and progressive politicians. Ma wrote an article 
in the influential journal Zhanlue yu guanli [Strategy and Management] 
calling for 'new thinking' on China's relations with Japan, in particular 
suggesting that the issue of history be put to one side (Ma 2002). A 
heated debate followed in scholarly journals over Ma's analysis, but the 
popular reaction was one of fury, especially on the internet. 
As with the case of Taiwan, anti-Japanese popular sentiment in the 
PRC is not able to determine policy, but it can restrict the arena avail- 
able for public debate and discussion about Japan. In turn this may 
limit the ability of the Chinese leadership to improve relations with its 
key regional trade and investment partner. As in the case of Taiwan, 
popular demands for growing self-assertion against Japan threaten to 
reduce state autonomy. While the Chinese leadership appears to want 
to pursue a pragmatic policy toward Japan, the mobilisation of the his- 
torical legacy in the context of popular Chinese nationalism constantly 
limits the ability of the Chinese leadership to develop and maintain a 
coherent relationship. 
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Self-Assertion versus Universalism: 
Ideology and Asian Values 
There are areas of self-assertion by the Chinese state which may meet 
with a degree of popular acceptance but that can lead the PRC into 
disagreements and possible (non-military) conflict with the west; one 
such area is in the ideological (or ideational) realm. Self-assertion on the 
international stage can be seen as the PRC exercising soft power in inter- 
national society. However, the CCP's normative preferences are likely 
to be significantly different from those of the dominant western states. 
Self-assertion by the Chinese leadership therefore may bring the PRC 
into conflict with some of the norms and values expressed by western 
states, while generating support for the PRC from other non-western 
developing countries. Chinese self-assertion in the ideological realm 
has manifested itself in criticism of the aims and logic of the 'universal- 
ism' that underpins many western claims about human rights. It also 
brings the CCP into conflict with the liberal economic philosophy that 
underpins much of the development discourse of institutions such as 
the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. 
International organizations and international regimes have become key 
institutions in international society since the end of the Second World 
War. International Organisations (10s) are institutions usually with 
formal bureaucracies and established rules and procedures. Typically 
membership comprises states, and the highest profile I 0  is the United 
Nations (UN). Kim has argued that, 'most of the time, on most global 
issues, Chinese international organisation behaviour is symbolic rather 
than substantive' (Kim 1994: 407). Kim is correct to highlight the impor- 
tance of symbolism in Chinese behaviour but perhaps oversimplifies the 
extent to which symbolism is substance for the Chinese leadership, par- 
ticular in the context of national self-assertion. A very important subset 
of international organizations is the International Financial Institutions 
(IFIs) such as the World Bank (WB), the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) and the World Trade Organization (WTO). It is important to note 
that none of the major international organizations is value neutral-the 
UN operates entirely through the system of sovereign statehood, and the 
IFIs are dominated by their major donors, in particular the United States. 
As such, the IFIs tend to promote economic ideologies which concur with 
the key objectives of the United States, typically favouring economic 
liberalism, privatization and deregulation, a position which in the 1990s 
became known as the Washington Consensus (Helleiner 2003). 
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The Chinese leadership appears to have embraced multilateralism 
in recent years, especially with regard to economic fora. The highest- 
profile move has been joining the WTO, but since 2000 the PRC has 
also increased its participation in a number of regional fora, especially 
with Southeast Asian countries (Cheng 2004). However, it is still not 
clear the extent to which the PRC has begun to internalize the norms 
of these institutions. It does appear that the PRC leadership views 
these institutions in instrumental terms, and is most concerned with 
how China can benefit from participation in a 'realist' way, rather than 
viewing the institution in terms of the wider goals that institutionalism 
may provide (Wan 2001). The Chinese government has been effective at 
avoiding many of the more stringent demands on funding that the IMF 
has placed on other developing countries, and has taken a principled 
position in international fora of criticizing the liberal assumptions of 
IMF and World Bank practice. Indeed, China's pursuit of an economic 
strategy in direct contravention of the Washington Consensus has led 
one economist to describe the emergence of a 'Beijing Consensus' among 
developing countries (Foreign Policy, 2004). While demonstrating a clear 
preference for Anglo-American economic norms, Perkins argues that 
the PRC remains a very long way from complying with the standards 
prescribed by the IMF and WTO but suggests that these IF1 recognise 
China's achievements to date (Perkins 2003). Greater reintegration into 
the world economic system is likely to further undermine the autonomy 
of the Chinese state to pursue independent economic strategies (Deans 
2004a). Indeed, self-assertion by opponents of China's growing integra- 
tion in the world economy is already significant, as is most clearly dem- 
onstrated in the high-profile book Qianqiuhua yingjingxia de Zhongguo zhi 
lu [China's Road in the Shadow of Globalization] (Fang et al. 1999). 
Another area where China may find that self-assertion leads to con- 
flict with other countries is in its approach to international regimes. An 
international regime is typically defined as, 'sets of implicit or explicit 
principles, norms, rules, and decision making procedures around which 
actors' expectations converge in a given area of international relations' 
(Krasner 1983: 2). One of the most important regimes in current times 
is that which addresses human rights, with a key document being the 
United Nations Declaration on Human Rights (Dunne and Wheeler 
1999). The Chinese leadership has been critical of a number of the as- 
sumptions that underlie the human rights agenda as developed by the 
west, and has consistently followed a line of pointing to the primacy of 
second-generation socio-economic rights over first-generation political 
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rights (Progress in China's Human Rights Cause, 2003). As Xu has shown, 
the 1990s -especially before the Asian financial crisis of 1997- saw sig- 
nificant criticism of western approaches to human rights and attempts 
at applying 'universal' standards to the region (Xu 2001). Inside the 
PRC an increasingly lively academic debate exists around the useful- 
ness and applicability of the idea of rights (Weatherley 2001). To some 
extent, China's criticism of the international human rights regime is 
self-serving and seeks simply to deflect criticism. However, it is also 
underpinned by a significant and sophisticated philosophical position 
that challenges many of that assumptions that inform liberal thinking 
on rights (Bell 2000; Brown 1999). Chinese self-assertion with regard 
to rights has manifested in the PRC's international diplomacy, most 
notably in the preparatory meetings which preceded the 1993 Vienna 
World Conference on Human Rights. The Chinese delegation played a 
lead role in the pre-meeting in Thailand which resulted in the 'Bangkok 
Declaration'. The Bangkok Declaration outlined a significant number of 
issues that question the western approach to the human rights regime, 
in particular by its added attention to socio-economic rights and by 
reference to the importance of sovereignty in international society. 
China's position on the human rights question is important because it 
has an international and external dimension. As Wachman has shown, 
the attempts to 'shame' China into complying with western human 
rights standards have not only been of limited effectiveness, but may 
prove counterproductive and lead to increasing disaffection with west- 
ern human rights proponents (Wachman 2001). Therefore the Chinese 
government's criticism of the international human rights regime may 
be a mechanism for exploiting popular anti-foreign sentiment. Further- 
more, by taking a lead role in criticizing aspects of the international 
human rights regime, the Chinese leadership can be seen as engaging 
in the construction and exercise of 'soft power'. Nye explains thatl[s]oft 
power is the ability to get what you want by attracting and persuading 
others to adopt your goals' (Nye 2003). The Chinese leadership has been 
able to use its position on rights to gain the respect of other Asian and 
African countries which are troubled by the approach the west takes 
on human rights questions. 
Implications and Conclusions 
All indications are that the fourth-generation leadership in the PRC in- 
tends to focus on creating an environment that will promote economic 
growth and development. However, the legitimacy of the CCP is lever- 
Phi1 Deans 
aged not solely on generating improved living standards but also on 
promoting the Chinese nationalist project. Increasingly the Chinese 
leadership is under pressure from elements within Chinese society, not 
only to deliver the economic goods, but also to satisfy growing nationalist 
aspirations. At times these objectives may be complementary, however 
on occasion there will be significant contradictions between the two, and 
popular pressure may reduce state autonomy. In terms understood and 
developed by Mao Zedong, the Party must ensure that when contradic- 
tions arise between economic reform and nationalist aspirations, that 
these remain non-antagonistic contradictions. In this context self-asser- 
tion may be a demonstration of weakness, rather than strength. Where 
self-assertion is more likely to be dynamic is in ideological realms, such 
as criticism of the western universal pretensions or American unilateral- 
ism. This is less likely to generate problems within the domestic realm, 
and may also win support for the PRC from other developing and less 
developed countries. However, arguments about the liberal economic 
assumptions that underpin the World Bank and International Monetary 
Fund may damage China's relations with these institutions, and China's 
willingness to challenge the claims of western human rights advocates 
is likely to further complicate dialogue with western states. 
The PRC leadership is keen to reassure its regional neighbours and 
global partners that China's rise is peaceful, as can be seen in a series of 
public statements by fourth-generation leaders since late 2003 (Jiefang 
Ribao, 26 April 2004). Furthermore intellectuals and commentators 
linked to President Hu have been promoting the 'peaceful rise' (heping 
jueqi) theory in Chinese media, although not without some opposition 
from the third-generation leadership (Suettinger 2004). With reference 
to prospects for greater regional cooperation, the PRC leadership is 
likely to pursue this only where it will not antagonize popular nation- 
alist sentiment. Recent years have seen the Chinese leadership engage 
increasingly with regional multilateral institutions, particularly eco- 
nomic institutions, and the Chinese leadership has skilfully managed 
to ease fears in much of Southeast Asia over China's growing economic 
strength. However, the issue of sovereignty is so deeply connected to 
the nationalist agenda that any political changes will be very cautious. 
As such, it is unlikely that the Chinese leadership would promote any 
form of greater co-operation that envisaged a dilution of sovereignty, 
such as that pursued by western European countries since the 1950s. 
National self-assertion in China and the rise of popular nationalism 
have important implications for non-regional powers such as the United 
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States and the European Union. Chinese nationalism is likely to respond 
negatively to outside involvement or intervention, and therefore outside 
powers are best advised to wait for invitation rather than threaten in- 
tervention. It is likely that any attempts by outside powers to intervene 
in what the Chinese people regard as domestic matters will generate 
a significant domestic pressure on the Chinese government. This was 
seen most starkly following the death of a Chinese pilot following a 
collision with a US spy place in 2002, but also manifests itself in the 
growing antagonism that western condemnation of human rights in 
China has generated. For the PRC's partners and China's neighbours, a 
weak Chinese leadership and a weak China poses a much greater chal- 
lenge than a strong and coherent China. The greatest challenge faced by 
the leadership of the CCP does not come from pressures for democracy 
and openness, but from reactionary and chauvinistic popular national- 
ism. The 'Three Represents' campaign calls on the Chinese leadership 
to represent progressive social forces; the challenge for Hu Jintao is to 
avoid becoming the representative of the forces of reaction. 
Phi1 Deans is Director at the Contemponary China Institute, Department of 
Politics and International Studies, University of London, School of Oriental 
and African Studies. 
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